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Appellants The Idaho Company ("Idaho Company"), Sky Enterprises, LLC ("Sky") and 
William F. Rigby ("Rigby") submit the following reply brief in accordance with I.A.R. 33(c). 
ill. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. Material Disputed Facts. 
1. Summary judgment standard. 
Appellees Jerry Losee and JoCarol Losee ("the Lo sees") argue that because this action 
will be tried before the Court without a jury, the trial court was "free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences."1 However, those inferences must be drawn from uncontroverted facts: 
"Where the evidentiary facts are not disputed, and the trial court rather than a jury will be the 
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, 
because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences."
2 
In this case, the evidentiary facts upon which the summary judgment was based are disputed, and 
the trial court was therefore not entitled to "arrive at the most probable inferences," since 
disputed facts must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, and the issue 
of inferences relating to those facts was never reached. 
1 Respondent's Brief, p. 3. 
2 Jenkins v. Barsalu, 145 Idaho 202,205, 177 P.3d 949,952 (2008), citing Riverside Dev. 
Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 647,661 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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2. Disputed facts. 
In granting partial summary judgment, the trial court apparently relied upon the following 
facts 3 asse1ted by the Losees, each of which is disputed by Appellants: 
DISPUTED FACT NO. 1: Idaho Company agreed to purchase its membership interest in 
Sky Enterprises, LLC, for $135,000 cash. · 
Idaho Company did not agree to provide cash to purchase its membership interest in Sky 
Enterprises, and the contract between the parties did not require that they do so. The 
Membership Purchase Agreement, signed by all paities, provides, at Section 2: "It is understood 
that the Investor"s Capital Contribution may be in the form of assistance with obtaining an 
operating credit line for Sky Enterprises, L.L.C."4 Appellants' position is further supported by 
testimony given by Appellee JoCarol Losee, under oath, in a previous legal proceeding, Baimock 
County Case No. CV-04-4501-OC, wherein she testified she understood the $135,000 was a loan 
which would have to be repaid. 5 
The obligation to repay the initial$ 135,000 did not fall on the Losees personally; rather 
Sky Enterprises was obligated to pay Idaho Company from future profits. All parties agreed to 
this contractual provision. While at first glance it may not appear that Idaho Company was 
risking anything, or paying anything for its one-half interest in the limited liability company, it is 
important to remember that this was a high-risk venture, and the Losees agreed to the terms. It is 
3 It is difficult to determine exactly what the trial court relied upon because the trial court 
failed to make findings of fact or conclusions oflaw. 
4R., Vol. I, p. 81. 
5R. Supp., pp. 54-55. 
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fair to assume that the Losees had been unable to secure financing elsewhere, and that they were 
unable to proceed without financial backing. Finally, it is important to remember that to date, 
Idaho Company has not been repaid any part of its investment, which now totals well over 
$300,000. Under Idaho law, competent adults are free to enter into contracts and to negotiate 
terms among themselves. For the trial court to second-guess those negotiations, and to do so in 
the context of sunnnary judgment, is contrary to well-established principles of Idaho law. 
DISPUTED FACT NO. 2: Appellants never paid the consideration for the purchase of its 
membership interest. 
Defendant Idaho Company did provide financing, in the amount of $135,000, as agreed 
to by all parties. JoCarol Losee admitted, under oath, that the $135,000 was received and 
expended by Sky during the time the Lo sees were in charge of managing the business. 
6 
In 
addition, Rigby's affidavit states: "Idaho Company fulfilled its obligation to Sky under the 
Membership Purchase Agreement by providing an operating line of credit to Sky in the sum of 
$135,000."7 
DISPUTED FACT NO. 3: Appellants forced the Losees to sign a Promissory Note and 
Deed of Trust, encumbering the Losees' personal residence. The Losees did not understand they 
had personal liability for the loans, and it was unfair that they should be personally liable. 
The Losees came to Idaho Company in the spring of 2004 to request additional funding; 
Appellants did not go to the Losees. 8 In fact, the Losees requested that the original credit line of 
6R. Supp., pp. 83-85. 
7R. Supp., p. 13, 1 3. 
8Id., 4. 
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$135,000 be nearly doubled. JoCarol Losee testified she was aware that the Losees were 
pledging their personal residence as security for the debt. 9 
In the context of evaluating the Losees' claim, it is important to remember that a good 
portion of the funds expended were utilized to construct a garage/shop building on the Losees' 
property, which they retain. The building is substantial, and increases the value of the Losees' 
property. It is also important to remember that Appellants' Counterclaim, on file with the trial 
court, together with Rigby' s affidavit, allege significant improprieties on the part of the Lo sees, 
including fraud, diversion of Sky funds for their own use and benefit, and mismanagement of 
company funds. The trial court has not heard testimony and evidence regarding these matters, 
nor has it had an opportunity to fairly evaluate the claims and counterclaims of the parties or to 
determine the credibility of witnesses. Summary judgment, where disputed facts exist, is not the 
proper forum to make such evaluations. 
The additional funding provided by Idaho Company constituted consideration for the 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust under any standard, and was a modification to the original 
contracts between the parties. This Court has held that "the doing by one of the parties of 
something that he is not legally bound to do constitutes consideration for the other's promise to 
modify the terms of the original agreement. "10 Under the terms of the original agreements 
between the parties, Idaho Company was obliged to finance only $135,000 of Sky expenses. The 
9R., Supp., p. 73, 11. 11-19, p. 74, 11. 11-14, pp. 83-85. 
10Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 769, 979 P.2d 
627,642 (1998). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF 4 
Losees were not obliged to repay that amount. However, as JoCarol Losee testified, there came 
a time when $135,000 was not enough. She also testified that the garage/shop came to be an 
expensive facility. 11 Presumably, part of the reason the Losees agreed to sign the Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust was so that the garage/shop could be finished, thereby enhancing the 
value of their property. Again, these are matters to be presented and evaluated at trial, so that 
factual questions can be fully explored and resolved. They are not matters that are ripe for 
summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings. 
It is undisputed that the Losees agreed, in writing, to be personally responsible for funds 
advanced by Idaho Company in exchange for Idaho Company advancing substantial additional 
funds. It is important to remember that the additional funds were granted iifter Idaho Company 
became aware of serious mismanagement of Sky by the Losees. Appellants submit that the 
evidence at trial will show that Idaho Company was reluctant to commit additional funds, and 
was having second thoughts as to the viability of Sky. Idaho Company had received reports that 
Sky was being mismanaged by the Losees at this juncture, and were understandably concerned 
about advancing additional money. 12 At trial, Idaho Company will submit testimony that it 
would not have advanced the funds, absent the grant of security by the Losees. Idaho Company 
took a considerable risk in advancing the additional funds. A reasonable person could certainly 
find that it was part of the bargain, and fair, that the Losees take some risk also. 
11 R. Supp., pp. 83-85. 
12R. Supp., pp. 32-33. 
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The July 2004 agreements meet all of the tests for mutuality of obligation. It is a well-
established principle of contract law tbat "contracts do not necessarily give identical rights to all 
parties. That is part of the bargaining process. " 13 Whether or not the trial court, with the scant 
evidence before it, believed the July 2004 agreements were fair or unfair, or were a good or bad 
bargain for the Losees, could not be grounds for a grant of summary judgment, given the 
enormity of the disputed facts in tbis case. 
DISPUTED FACT NO. 4: The Deed of Trust and Promissory Note were either void or 
voidable, and lacked consideration. 
As argued supra, the advance of an additional $126,000 constituted consideration for the 
Deed of Trust and Promissory Note. The Idaho Courts have held "adequacy of consideration to 
be a matter exclusively for the decision of the parties."14 In this case, the Losees agreed, at the 
time they signed the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust, that the consideration was adequate. 
They accepted the consideration, and expended it, in part for their own benefit. 15 They now seek 
to repudiate the contract; however, they have not tendered back the consideration they received, 
nor have they repaid either Sky or Idaho Company for funds they utilized for their own benefit. 
The Losees have not argued that their contract with Appellants was illegal, that it was 
illusory, or that it violated public policy. Indeed, they cannot do so, because such clearly is not 
13 Doughty v. Idaho Frozen Foods Corp., 112 Idaho 79 l, 794, 736 P .2d 460, 463 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
14Jd, 112 Idaho at 463. 
15In addition to the garage/shop building, they have retained a motor vehicle and bedroom 
set purchased with Sky funds. They also have admitted to diverting Sky funds to pay their own 
personal household bills and expenses. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 6 
the case. Because this theory was not presented to the trial court until oral argument on the 
motion for partial summary judgment, it is difficult to determine the Losees' basis for the claim, 
or what the trial court relied upon in making its ruling from the bench. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has stated that"[ o )nly in special circumstances may a court of equity set aside contracts 
fairly and freely negotiated."16 Certainly the trial court was without sufficient testimony and 
evidence to make that determination at this juncture. This case is rife with factual disputes 
which cannot be resolved without a trial on the merits. 
DISPUTED FACT NO. 5: The Losees were told the Deed of Trust would not be 
recorded. 
This contention by the Losees is directly contradicted by testimony of Rigby in his 
affidavit. Rigby testified that he explained the purpose of the Deed of Trust was to secure the 
Idaho Company loan, that he specifically informed them the Deed of Trust would be recorded, 
and that it was, in fact recorded in Bannock County, and was a matter of public record. 17 
DISPUTED FACT NO. 6: The contract documents are contradictory. 
The Losees also point to ambiguities and/or conflicting provisions in the contract 
documents. In particular; they direct this Court's attention to a provision in the Operating 
Agreement regarding debts incurred by Sky Enterprises, arguing that it negates the provisions of 
the Membership Purchase Agreement. Appellants do not believe the documents contradict one 
another, or that the Losees have properly interpreted the Operating Agreement. However, if a 
16Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491,494, 725 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1986). 
17R. Supp., pp. 13-14, 9-12. 
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conflict between the two documents exists, rendering either or both ambiguous, Idaho law is 
clear: 
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent 
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found 
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question oflaw. 18 
In this case, if the contracts in question are ambiguous, i.e. subject to more than one 
plausible interpretation, or self-contradictory, when construed together, then summary judgment 
cannot lie because a question of fact exists. The trial court was then required to look to extrinsic 
evidence to determine the intent of the parties at the time the contracts were executed, 19 
precluding entry of summary judgment. 
In Land O'Lakes v. Bray,20 the trial court did not merely draw inferences from 
uncontroverted facts, but also made credibility determinations and made findings regarding 
disputed facts. The Idaho Court of Appeals, overturning the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, held that this was impermissible on sununary judgment, even when the court would be 
the fact finder at trial: 
18Jntermountain Eye and Laser Centers, PLLCv. Miller, 142 Idaho 218,222, 127 P.3d 
121, 125 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
19 See, e.g. Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 130 Idaho I 05, I 07, 937 P.2d 417, 419 
(1997). 
20 138 Idaho 817, 69 P.3d 1078 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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The legal standard allowing a trial court presented with a summary judgment 
motion to draw inferences favorable to the movant is to be applied only in the 
face of undisputed facts. When evidence on material issues is in conflict, the 
evidentiary facts must be viewed in favor of the party opposing the motion.
21 
In this case, like Land O'Lakes, the trial court erred when it failed to construe the 
disputed evidentiary facts in favor of Appellants. The trial court's grant of partial 
summary judgment to the Losees was in error, and should be reversed on appeal. 
B. Quasi-Estoppel. 
The Losees' mischaracterize Appellant's argument regarding the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel. The claim is predicated upon JoCarol Losee's testimony in previous litigation that she 
knew that the Lava Home was being used as collateral for the $261,000 loan and that Idaho 
Company could look to the Lava Home for security as an alternate means of collecting its debt.
22 
Thereafter, in the instant litigation, Mrs. Losee asserted that "[n]either my husband nor I 
understood that our execution of these documents [Promissory Note and Deed of Trust] would 
amount to a lien against our home and real property."23 While the Losees' signature on the loan 
documents and Deed of Trust also supports Appellants' position, it is Mrs. Losee' s clear 
testimony that she understood what was being done, and knew a lien was being placed on the 
property which should invoke the doctrine of quasi-estoppel to prevent her later assertion to the 
contrary. 
21 Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817,819, 69 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ct. App. 2003), 
emphasis in original. 
22 R., Supp. p. 74, 11. 4-25, p. 75, IL 11-14. 
23 R., Vol. II, p. 199, ,I 14. 
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C. Failure to Enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The trial court's failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions oflaw make it difficult 
to determine basis for the grant of summary judgment. The Losees' recitation of"salient 
undisputed facts" in Respondent's Brief adds no clarity to the problem, and ignores other facts, 
including the Losees' personal use of Sky funds and their retention of the garage/shop building 
erected with loan proceeds. These issues complicate the alleged "simplicity of the factual 
dispute." Moreover, under the facts set forth by the Losees, the trial court had no basis to void 
the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note in their entirety. Even were the Losees' "salient 
undisputed facts" construed to support a reduction for the $135,000 operating line initially 
provided to the company, they do not support setting aside the entirety of the $261,000 
obligation. 
The trial court's brevity also blurs the line between facts and inferences from those facts. 
Because the underlying facts upon which the court relied in granting partial summary judgment 
are not delineated, it is likewise impossible to determine what inferences the trial court drew, and 
from what source. All of these factors militate against sustaining the trial court's determination 
regarding the partial summary judgment. 
D. Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
As argued in Appellants' Brief; the Appellants are entitled to their attorney's fees and 
costs pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust, Promissory Note and Security Agreement. 
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In the alternative, Appellants should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs pursuant 
to LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This case is replete with genuine issues of material fact which are in dispute. The trial 
court failed to properly construe those facts in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, 
and instead, apparently gave the moving party the benefit of not only inferences drawn from the 
evidence before it, but of the construction of the facts themselves. As this Court has previously 
stated, motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution, and in this case it was 
inappropriate. The grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Losees should be reversed, 
and Appellants should be awarded their attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2-r'J.ay of February, 2009. 
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;7 
E.W. Pike & Associates, P.A. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
11 
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